This very brief paper provides plausible answers to the two residual questions that Jamie Tappenden states, but leaves unanswered, in his 2024 paper ‘Following Bobzien: Some notes on Frege’s development and engagement with his environment’, namely, why Frege read Sigwart’s Logik and what caused Frege to read Prantl.

Suppose that someone (S) is worthy of blame for something they have done (α). What makes that so? What makes S worthy of blame for α? Here is one popular answer: what S did ‘manifested’ a defect in their character. Call theories of blameworthiness which say this Manifested Character Theories. Herein, I argue against such theories. They require a coherent notion of what it is for character traits to be ‘manifested’ in our doings. Unfortunately, the available notions of ‘manifestation’ are (...) either: (i) extensionally inadequate, (ii) normatively unmotivated, (iii) incoherent or (iv) provide us with the tools needed to explain our blameworthiness absent appeal to our character traits. (shrink)

Interest in interdisciplinary research combining the law with psychology is growing. Yet, methodological concerns remain as to the normative signficance of the underlying psychological work. This article considers the extent to which psychological evidence can help us to answer questions of a normative nature. It demonstrates that, despite the so-called ‘is-ought’ gap, empirical facts are essential to a normative inquiry. It subsequently argues that, given their particular nature, psychological fact statements can play an especially important role in answering normative questions. (...) It follows that interdisciplinary research combining the law with psychology has the capacity to make valuable contributions to normative legal debates. By illuminating the limits and capabilities of psychological evidence – and fact statements more generally – to a normative inquiry, the framework developed here aims to go some way to facilitating such contributions. (shrink)